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Abstract
Modern state bureaucracies are designed to be insulated from political interference.
Successful insulation implies that politicians’ electoral incentives do not affect bureaucrats’
corruption. I test this prediction by assembling a unique dataset on corruption, promotions
and demotions for more than 4 million Indonesian local civil servants. To identify the
effect of reelection incentives, I exploit the existence of term limits and a difference-in-
difference strategy. I find that reelection incentives decrease the corruption behaviour of
both top and administrative bureaucrats, which constitutes new evidence of the deep, far-
reaching effects of politicians’ accountability on local civil servants. I explore a mechanism
where bureaucrats have career concerns and politicians facing reelection manipulate such
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concerns by increasing the turnover of top bureaucrats. Consistent with this mechanism,
I find that reelection incentives increase demotions of top bureaucrats and promotions of
administrative bureaucrats.
Key words: Corruption; Elections; Bureaucracy.
JEL Classification codes: D72, D73, H83, K40, O17.
1 Introduction
While most of the countries in the world have adopted some variation of the Weberian bu-
reaucratic system,1 which essentially insulates the bureaucracy from political influence, in no
country is such insulation complete (Global Integrity 2006-2013). Strong insulation of bureau-
crats from politicians is often advocated as protection against political patronage. However,
voters judge politicians based on economic outcomes generated by both politicians and bureau-
crats. Providing politicians with greater control over bureaucrats can enhance their reelection
incentives (Ujhelyi 2014a). According to this view, a completely insulated bureaucracy would
shut down the disciplining effect of elections, which is one of its core functions.2 More gener-
ally, civil service rules can interfere with the ability of elections to discipline politicians. This
is consistent with the observation that, while few governments have questioned the principle
of meritocratic recruitment,3 the optimal level of control over the bureaucracy has been more
controversial.4
In this paper, I test whether, in a setting where most of the typical civil service system
features are present, but the politician retains some control over the appointment of top
bureaucrats, the politician uses this power for reelection purposes. First, I evaluate the
effect of politicians’ reelection incentives on the demotions and the corruption behavior of top
1The main features of Weberian bureaucracies are: meritocratic recruitment, tenure-based salaries, low
risk of getting fired, and internal promotions.
2Political influence can also be a factor of positive change during democratization, a time when the turnover
of politicians precedes the turnover of bureaucrats who are typically inherited from the previous regime (Ace-
moglu, Ticchi and Vindigni 2011).
3This principle was introduced with the US Pendleton Act of 1883. See Rauch (1995) and Ujhelyi (2014b)
for an empirical analysis.
4See the US Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, as well as Thatcher’s policies of the 1970s (Lah and Perry
(2008), Perry (2008), Ujhelyi (2014a).
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bureaucrats. Second, I evaluate the effect of politicians’ reelection incentives on the pool of
candidates for top positions: administrative bureaucrats and front-line service providers.
I investigate this question using data from Indonesia, a young democracy with a standard
Weberian bureaucratic system, where politicians have the power to influence internal promo-
tions and the selection of new recruits, but otherwise have no power to fire civil servants or
to recruit top bureaucrats from outside the civil service.
I study this question using a unique dataset on corruption, promotions and demotions for
more than 4 million local civil servants. I measure corruption by constructing a dataset of
corruption offences from corruption prosecutions. The main advantage of this data is that
it allows me to identify whether corruption offences involve politicians, top or administrative
bureaucrats, front-line service providers or private agents (contractors). The data that I
extract from these documents is rich enough to allow me to run several tests for potential
manipulation of corruption law enforcement.
The identification strategy is based on the existence of term limits for local politicians.
This feature, jointly with the prevalence of first-term politicians at the beginning of the period
that I consider, allows me to estimate a simple difference-in-difference model, where I follow
districts with first and second-term politicians before and after local elections. This strategy
and the wealth of available data allow me to control for various endogeneity threats and to
validate the identification assumption by estimating several placebo effects.
Most political economy models assume that politicians’ reelection depends on the level
of public goods. For any given level of public expenditure, any capture of funds reduces
resources available for public good provision. If public service provision depends uniquely on
these resources, then the politician will want to reduce bureaucrats’ corruption, even more so
if corruption directly harms his reelection chances through media exposure (Ferraz and Finan
2008).5
How will the politician force the bureaucrats to reduce their corruption activities (or to
devote more effort to public good provision)? The literature on front-line service providers
5However, if public service provision depends on both the level of resources and on the bureaucrats’ level
of effort, the politician might not necessarily want to reduce bureaucrats’ corruption, because that constitutes
an incentive to work (Lichand, Lopes and Madeiros 2016).
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emphasizes the potential importance of increased monitoring, but this could have limited
effectiveness if the politician lacks enforcing mechanisms. In absence of the ability to fire
civil servants, the politician might reduce bureaucrats’ engagement in corrupt activities by
manipulating their career concerns.6
I estimate that civil servants’ corruption is 56 percent lower when the local government
head faces reelection. The effect is driven by top and administrative bureaucrats, while I find
no effect for front-line civil servants, politicians and private agents (contractors). Consistent
with the mechanism based on career concerns, I find that reelection incentives increase de-
motions of top bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats. The timing of the
effects corroborates the career concern interpretation: if the decrease in bureaucrats’ corrup-
tion is generated by career concerns, then it must take place before or during the same year of
the increase in promotions and demotions; consistent this fact, both effects are concentrated
during the first 2-3 years of the political mandate.7 This suggests that the control of the
politician over the top bureaucrats also generates incentives for the low-level bureaucrats.
Hence, the inability of the politician to fire bureaucrats does not prevent him from having an
influence over the behavior of low-level bureaucrats.
I then test for a second mechanism based on local public expenditure.8 Specifically, I
test whether reelection incentives generated a decrease in total expenditure or a change in
expenditure across sectors. The former could decrease corruption almost mechanically, while
the latter could decrease corruption if the compositional change was in favor of sectors that
6An increase in monitoring can strengthen this mechanism, but it is not necessary.
7In a more sophisticated version of the career concern mechanism, the politician could select the new top
bureaucrats along some specific dimension, such as honesty or loyalty. In this case, the increased turnover
of top bureaucrats would also generate a compositional change (such as, for instance, an increase in average
honesty or loyalty) that could also contribute to decrease corruption. Selection along a specific characteristic
also implies that the incentive (or career concern) mechanism will depend on the share of low-level bureaucrats
with that characteristic (or perhaps an even larger share if the characteristic is private information). While it
is beyond the scope of this paper to separate these incentives and selection effects, what might be relevant here
is that the incentive effect will last until promotions and demotions are realized, while the selection effect will
take place after their realization. An alternative mechanism also based on promotions and demotions centers
instead on job rotations as a device to break up the repeated interaction between bureaucrats and private
agents. Abbink (2004) provides lab evidence that staff rotations can decrease corruption.
8There is a rich literature on the effect of electoral accountability on fiscal policies, which starts with
theoretical work by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), obtains empirical support with Besley and Case (1995)
and List and Sturm (2006) and continues theoretically with Besley (2006) and Smart and Sturm (2013). See
Aschworth (2012) for a recent survey. Shi and Svensson (2006) also provide evidence on public expenditure
and political cycles around the world.
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are less vulnerable to capture by bureaucrats.9 I find that reelection incentives had only weak
effects on total and sectoral expenditure. Specifically, they had no effect throughout the first
part of the political mandate; the only effect is an increase in total expenditure the year before
the forthcoming elections, which could explain, at most, why the effect on corruption is muted
during the last year. Estimates also suggest no noteworthy change in sectoral expenditure.
The paper makes three contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on the per-
sonnel of the state,10 which is rich when it comes to front-line service providers,11 while it is
much less developed when it comes to bureaucrats. This might be due to the typical reluc-
tance of central governments to release data on civil servants (if such data exist) or to allow
researchers to collect data. In fact, a large share of few existing studies focuses on Indian top
civil servants, for which there exist excellent data.12 Indeed, the mechanism outlined above
builds on the finding that top bureaucrats can influence economic outcomes (Bertrand et al.
2016). This paper speaks to this research by studying contemporaneously several types of
civil servants (top and administrative bureaucrats, as well as front-line civil servants) with
a particular focus on administrative bureaucrats (i.e., the primary pool of candidates to be-
come top bureaucrats) and by providing rich and highly disaggregated data for all Indonesian
districts, i.e., one of the biggest in the world.
Second, the paper contributes to a more specific literature on the interaction between
politicians and bureaucrats. Existing studies suggest that political turnover can be associated
with top bureaucrats’ transfers (Iyer and Mani 2012) and that political competition can
influence the speed of approval of development projects by top bureaucrats close to promotion
review (Nath 2016). I contribute in three different ways: first, by showing that politicians’
9This compositional change might be driven, for instance, by the politician diverting resources from long-
run investment to short-run projects, or from maintenance/non-visible to visible projects (Robinson and Torvik
2005).
10See Finan, Olken and Pande (2015) for a recent review of existing studies.
11Front-line service providers are primarily teachers, doctors and nurses. Prominent examples of the litera-
ture on these civil servants are Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2012) for teachers’ absenteeism; Banerjee, Glennerster
and Duflo (2012) for nurses’ absenteeism; Callen et al (2015) for clinic doctors’ fake reports; and Banerjee,
Chattoparday, Duflo, Keniston and Singh (2014) for police officers. By focussing on community development
agents and tax collectors, Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) and Khan, Khwaja and Olken (2015) are perhaps
the closest examples of a randomized intervention involving bureaucrats rather than front-line civil servants.
Their focus, however, is on the effect of financial incentives on job performance.
12Bertrand et al (2016), Iyer and Mani (2012), Nath (2016). Other work focuses on Nigeria (Rasul and
Rogger 2016), Ghana (Williams 2015), Uganda (Raffler 2016) and China (Bai and Jia 2016).
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incentives can influence bureaucrats far below the top layer; second, by showing evidence of
manipulation of internal promotions linking different tiers of the bureaucracy; and, third, by
focussing on corruption behavior.
More generally, the evidence in this paper complements the theory by Ujhelyi (2014a) to
suggest that, if we want to understand the effect of political institutions on economic outcomes,
then we should pay more attention to their complementarity with civil service institutions.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on corruption.13 Bureaucrats’ corrup-
tion is commonly considered one of the main obstacles to economic activities in developing
countries.14 While a lot of attention has been paid to the strategic interaction between bu-
reaucrats (Shleifer and Visny 1993, Olken and Barron 2009) or, in the context of front-line
service providers, on monitoring,15 much less attention has been paid to electoral pressures.
The closest paper to this project is Ferraz and Finan (2011), who use cross-sectional data
on Brazilian municipalities to show that reelection incentives are associated with a decrease
in corruption. This paper builds on their findings by i) estimating separately the effect on
corruption by politicians, top and administrative bureaucrats, front-line service providers and
private agents (contractors); ii) disaggregating the effect on bureaucrats’ corruption over the
political cycle; and iii) exploring the role of bureaucrats’ promotions and public expenditure
as channels of transmission.
The paper develops as follows: Section 2 provides the context; Section 3 describes the data;
Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and presents the main results; Section 5 presents a
variety of robustness checks; Section 6 discusses the mechanisms; and Section 7 concludes.
13See Olken and Pande (2012), Banerjee, Hanna and Mulainathan (2013), Burguet, Ganuza and Montalvo
(2016) for recent surveys of the literature.
14Estimating the magnitude of this corruption is difficult. Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Khwaja and Mian
(2005), Fisman (2001) and Niehaus and Sukhantar (2010) find large estimates of corruption in a variety of
settings. Svensson (2003) reports that over 80 percent of firms in Uganda report having paid bribes. Reinikka
and Svensson (2004) find that 87 percent of central government spending for an education program in Uganda
did not reach beneficiary schools. Olken (2006, 2007) finds estimates of corruption of 18 percent (of program
expenditure) and 24 percent (of road construction costs). Consistent with the view that corruption is a major
obstacle to development, the World Bank has supported over 600 anti-corruption programs around the world
since 1996 (Banerjee, Hanna and Mullainathan 2013).
15Recent works in this strand of literature include Duflo et al (2012), Banerjee et al (2008), Callen et al.
(2015).
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2 Context
In this section, I outline the structure of local governments and, separately, provide a descrip-
tion of corruption schemes in Indonesia. Regarding the structure of local governments, I focus
on the appointment and responsibilities of local politicians and civil servants and describe the
type of influence that the former might exert on the latter.
2.1 Local politicians: appointment, responsibilities and term limits
The administrative structure in Indonesia is composed of several layers: the central govern-
ment, the provinces (33), the districts (390), the sub-districts (about 4,000) and the villages
(about 76,000). The district (called kabupaten or kota) is the most important administrative
layer besides the central government. It is responsible for the provision of local public goods.16
The district is headed by a local government composed of a district head (called bupati in
rural districts and walikota in urban districts) and a vice-head (called wakil). It is also as-
sisted by a local parliament (called DPRD), whose members are responsible for analysing and
approving the yearly budget submitted by the district government.
District governments stay in power for five years. District heads can be elected for up to
two mandates (either consecutive or not).17 The position of district head is very prestigious. In
fact, 80 percent of first-term district heads run for reelection. However, political competition
is often fierce. Conditional on running for reelection, the probability of winning is 70 percent.
Throughout the rest of the paper, I will refer to elected public officers (district head, vice
16District governments received this responsibility from the central government in 1999 following a large
decentralization program. While the program decentralized most responsibilities concerning local public good
provision (and therefore the expenditure side), it kept the revenue side essentially centralized: district admin-
istrations kept receiving substantial formula-based transfers from the central government, thus retaining very
limited power over tax rates in their own territory. Olsson and Valsecchi (2015) exploit the formula determining
the transfers to identify the effect of resource revenue windfalls on local public good provision.
17Local deputies also have a mandate of five years, but do not face term limits. An important difference
between elections for district parliaments and elections for district governments is that the former take place
at the same time throughout all of Indonesia (1999, 2004, 2009), while the latter take place at different times
throughout the country: 1999-2004 (first wave), 2005-2009 (second wave), 2010-2014 (third wave). The timing
of these elections is driven primarily by the year of formation of the district, natural death of the district
head, or district head resigning to run for gubernatorial or other elections. The timing of district elections is
arguably exogenous to many district observable and unobservable characteristics. Valsecchi (2013), Skoufias
(2014), Sjo¨holm and Moricz (2014) and Mukherjee (2014) exploit this timing as a source of exogeneity to
identify the effect of local elections on a variety of economic outcomes.
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district head, local deputies, and elected village heads)18 as politicians.
2.2 Local civil servants: recruitment and promotions
There are about 4.6 million civil servants in Indonesia.19 The number of local civil servants
is 3.5 million (including teachers, doctors, nurses and social workers).
Indonesian bureaucrats are recruited through a competitive examination. The candidates
who pass this examination enter the local civil service as administrative bureaucrats (Jabatan
Fungsional Umum, or JFU ), numbering about 1,400 in an average district, or front-line
service providers (Jabatan Fungsional Tertentu, or JFT ), numbering about 3,400 on average
in a district (mostly teachers, doctors, nurses and social workers). They also get assigned a
rank. Rank and tenure are the only determinants of the salary. Civil servants enjoy automatic
promotions to higher ranks every four years. Promotions to higher ranks also constitute a
requirement for promotion to top (or managerial) positions (called eselon).
Top positions constitute the fundamental skeleton of the local administration: they range
from secretary of the local government (the highest civil servant) to heads of the various de-
partments (typically between 20 and 30)20 to sub-department and office heads. Top positions
constitute the most prestigious and most powerful jobs within the civil service. Indeed, the
competition to achieve these positions is ferocious: simply consider that they typically amount
to 2-300 positions, while, on average, there are about 5000 civil servants working for a local
government.
Promotions to top positions are open exclusively to civil servants with several years in
office, who (typically) come from the same local governments. Most importantly, and differ-
ently from promotions to higher ranks, the district head can heavily influence promotions to
18Villages are typically headed by elected village heads, called Kepala Desa. See Martinez-Bravo (2014,
2016) for a political economy analysis of Indonesian villages.
19According to the World Bank (2000), in 1999, there were 5.6 million public sector employees, of whom 1
million were employed in state enterprises and 4.6 were employed by the general government. Among these 4.6
million, 0.5 million were employed by the military and the police, while 4 million were civil servants. Among
these 4 million, there were 0.5 million regional civil servants, 1.7 central but seconded to regions, and 1.7 who
were central without being seconded. According to Statistiks Indonesia (2008, 2011), in 2007 and 2010, there
were 4 and 4.6 million local civil servants.
20While the number and labelling of departments can vary from district to district, the most common are
the department of education, health, infrastructure, marine resources, culture and tourism, finance, religion,
research and development, and environment.
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top positions, both in terms of quantity of promotions, demotions and transfers, and in terms
of who gets promoted, demoted or transferred. Specifically, case study evidence suggests
that district heads can influence promotions and/or demotions by influencing the activities
of the local government secretary. This secretary, in turn, is responsible for the activities of
the Human Resource Department (Badan Kepegawaian Daerah), which, in turn, handles all
promotions, demotions and transfers in a local government (World Bank 2011).
2.3 Prosecution of corruption offences
The data on corruption offences used in this paper originates from corruption prosecutions.
In this section, I outline how corruption offences are prosecuted.
There are two bodies in charge of prosecuting corruption offences: the General Attorney
Office (AGO) and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK). AGO has its head-
quarters in Jakarta, provincial offices in each provincial capital and district offices in each
district. AGO is in charge of prosecuting both normal and “special” crimes, where the latter
are largely corruption crimes. Corruption prosecutions are triggered by police investigations
and prosecutors’ investigations. While an investigation can start from a citizen’s complaint
(or an audit report), a prosecution requires solid evidence. Specifically, it requires at least
two qualitatively different kinds of evidence among the following: witness’ statements (at
least two); a letter or document; statements of defendants from separate prosecutions; and
evidence from investigative tools (for example, wire-tapping). Once the evidence is available,
the investigation is handed over to a prosecutor,21 who opens a prosecution and prepares the
case for the trial. Once the case goes to trial, the judge listens to the prosecutor and the
defendant’s lawyer, reviews the evidence and issues a verdict.
Prosecutors are formally independent from local governments. Their promotions, demo-
tions and transfers depend on the provincial attorney office, which, in turn, responds to the
General Attorney Office in Jakarta. The only prosecutor who owes his/her appointment to
a politician or a political body is the General Attorney in Jakarta, who is appointed directly
by the President of the Republic. Hence, local politicians have no formal power to influence
21In case of investigation by a prosecutor, the case is handed over to a different prosecutor.
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the local prosecutors’ activities.22
The National Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) was created in 2002 and started oper-
ating in 2004. Its main functions are to coordinate and monitor the activities of the police and
the local prosecutors’ offices and to prosecute cases of substantial size (above 1 billion IDR
or 100,000 USD). It typically prosecutes or at least monitors cases involving district heads or
prominent politicians.
2.4 Corruption schemes
In this subsection, I provide some examples of corruption schemes involving politicians, top
bureaucrats, or administrative bureaucrats. Corruption activities at the local level are pri-
marily about diversion of public funds and fraud in procurement.
With respect to diversion of public funds, three examples illustrate well the typical mech-
anisms. Between 2007 and 2012, the district mayor of Kabupaten Buleleng issued a decree
according to which the mining, plantation and forestry industries in the district would have
had to pay an additional land and building tax. The decree was illegal, because it contradicted
a ministerial regulation. In addition, the district and vice-district heads pocketed the revenue
from this tax. As second example, in 2007, the head of the revenue, wealth and asset division
of the finance department of Kabupaten Sidoarjo, who was supposed to distribute money
to support 72 orphanages, kept some of the funds for himself. A third, somewhat similar
example, concerns an administrative bureaucrat: between 2008 and 2010, one of the “salary
treasurers” of Kabupaten Semarang, who was supposed to distribute salaries to teachers, used
some of the funds to repay her loans.
With respect to fraud in procurement, I provide two simple examples. Between 2005 and
2006, the head of the public works department of Kabupaten Nunukan awarded a road project
to a contractor (who was not the best bidder) in exchange for a bribe. In 2007, the secretary
of the land acquisition committee of Kabupaten Cianjur colluded with a land owner to acquire
land at above-market prices.
22This does not exclude the possibility of informal influence. I will address this possibility in Section 5.
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3 Data
In this section I describe the three main datasets used in this paper. First, a dataset on
politicians, bureaucrats and private agents’ (contractors’) corruption offences for 2002-2011.
This dataset is used to generate a measure of corruption offences for the period covered by
the empirical analysis (2002-2011). Second, the universe of all bureaucrats’ promotions and
demotions during 2002-2011. Finally, the complete history of district mayors for 1995-2014.
3.1 Politicians, bureaucrats and contractors’ corruption offences
To measure corruption, I rely on documents on corruption cases prosecuted or coordinated by
the General Attorney Office (AGO) in 2008-2013. For each corruption offence, the documen-
tation includes a description of the case and several characteristics of the defendants.23 From
this documentation, I extract the location and the date of the offence, the type of official
involved and the year of the prosecution. This provides me with 1141 corruption offences for
which I can determine these characteristics. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics. Of-
fences can take place once or repeatedly. The maximum duration is 12 years, with an average
of 0.64 years;24 30 percent of the offences lasted more than one year; the average number of
defendants is 1.32; 19 percent of the offences have more than one defendant; 11 percent of the
offences involve at least one politician (3 percent involve a district head); 66 percent involve
at least one bureaucrat; and 31 percent involve at least one private agent. It takes about
three years, on average, to prosecute an offence; 20 percent of the offences are prosecuted 1
year later; 26 percent are prosecuted 2 years later; 19 percent are prosecuted 3 years later.
About one-third of the cases were at the prosecution stage; about two-thirds were the court
stage.25
23Annual reports from AGO suggest that prosecutors’ activity was fairly weak before 2008. Indeed, the
data to which I received access includes some prosecutions that took place before 2008, but these are relatively
few.
24The description of the offences included in the dataset always specifies the year of the offence (and
sometimes even the month). However, it is not always clear whether the offence took place continuously
throughout the year or just at a specific point in time. A duration of zero years is specified whenever the
description indicated a specific year, but it should be interpreted as “zero to one” years. The same applies to
all other values of this variable.
25The percentage of cases at the prosecution and court stage is greater than 100 percent because, for 21
cases, defendants prosecuted for the offence were at different stages of the process.
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Because the dataset includes all corruption offences prosecuted within 2013, the ability of
the data to record corruption offences decreases as the time approaches 2013. This implies
that, the longer the time span of the quantitative analysis, the lower the accuracy of the
corruption data. For this reason, I will limit the quantitative analysis to offences that took
place up to 2011.
The reports vary a lot in the level of detail. This typically does not prevent the identifi-
cation of the main information used in this paper (district, year of the offence, occupation of
the defendant, year of the prosecution), but it makes it hard to code (or estimate) the total
amount of resources related to corrupt activities in a systematic way. For this reason, the
empirical analysis will focus on the number of offences in a given district-year,26 rather than
on the share of resources embezzled.27 Nonetheless, for about 48 percent of the offences, it is
also possible to extract the information on the monetary size of the embezzlement and, for
a smaller percentage (18 percent), even the size of the project that suffered the capture of
funds. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for these amounts. Because the distribution of
both project size and embezzlement is highly skewed, I will discuss only median values. The
summary statistics suggest two important facts. First, corruption constitutes a substantial
share of project size (36 percent). Second, corruption involving politicians (median embezzle-
ment of 105,000 USD) is qualitatively different from corruption involving bureaucrats (18,000
USD) or private agents (18,000 USD).28
One general issue with prosecution-based corruption measures is that corruption might be
associated with weak state capacity. In turn, weak state capacity might be associated with
poor corruption law enforcement. Hence, corruption in areas with strong state capacity could
be over-reported, while corruption in areas with weak state capacity could be under-reported.
26Note that this measure differs from previous prosecution-based measures of corruption used in the lit-
erature (such as Glaeser and Saks 2006, and Fisman and Gatti 2002a,b), because it records the number of
corruption events that took place in a given district year, and not the number of prosecutions in a given
district-year.
27Estimating the value of corruption violations is a delicate exercise. Using data on budget irregularities
for Brazilian municipalities, Ferraz and Finan (2011) run their empirical analysis on both number and value
of corruption violations, while Lichand, Lopes and Madeiros (2016) use only the number of violations.
28KPK prosecutions cover primarily politicians and large amounts (at least 100,000 USD), so one would
expect that the inclusion of KPK reports is driving this difference. However, the median “AGO” embezzlement
involving politicians is actually 75,000 USD.
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In principle, the reporting bias might be so strong as to overturn the (positive) relationship
between number of corruption offences and true corruption.
In order to get a sense of whether prosecuted corruption increases with true corruption,
I compare the prosecution-based measure with a central government, audit-based measure
of budget irregularities. Budget irregularities are a popular measure of corruption (Ferraz
and Finan 2011, 2008),29 which offers the advantage of being less prone to local corruption
law enforcement concerns, because central government audits are carried out every year by
the same government agency in the capital on all local government budgets. Because the
number of budget irregularities refers to the district budget, I restrict the prosecution-based
measure of corruption to offences related to such budget. Table 3 shows the results of an
OLS regression of the number of corruption offences on the number of budget irregularities
(in levels, Col. 1-2, and in logs, Col. 3-4). I also replace budget irregularities with the subset
of irregularities most likely associated with corruption (in levels, Col. 5-6, and logs, Col.
7-8). The estimates suggest that the prosecution-based measure of corruption is positively
correlated with the central government’s audit-based measure of corruption and, therefore,
that corruption law enforcement does not seem to be distributed so unevenly as to call into
question the relationship between prosecution and true corruption. I will discuss further the
relationship between corruption and corruption law enforcement in Section 5.
3.2 Bureaucrats’ promotions and demotions
For this project, I use novel disaggregated data on bureaucrats’ promotions and demotions.
The dataset includes the number of civil servants and their promotions and demotions aggre-
gated by district, year and category of civil servant. This dataset allows me to investigate
both the effect of reelection incentives on bureaucrats’ promotions and demotions and the
effect on recruitment, in addition to the effect on local government size. The dataset covers
all Indonesian districts for the period 2002-2015.
29It is not a perfect measure, because it is hard to separate corruption from mismanagement. Most impor-
tantly, it provides no detail on who is directly responsible for the budget irregularity.
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3.3 History of district mayors in power over 1995-2014
While a political mandate is five years long throughout the entire country, the timing of
elections varies across local government. For instance, local governments with appointments
in 1995 will typically go through elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010, while governments with
appointments in 1998 will typically go through elections in 2003, 2008 and 2013. Throughout
the rest of the paper, I will call “round of appointments” a time window (such as, for instance,
2005-2008) large enough to cover one and only one appointment for each local government.
Later in the empirical analysis, I will generate an “election-wave” variable indicating whether
a district went through elections at the first, second, third, fourth or fifth year of a round
(such as, for instance, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 or 2009).
I reconstructed the history of district mayors in power over four consecutive rounds of
appointments (1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014).30 For all these four political
mandates, I identify the date of the appointment as well as the identities of the district and
vice-district mayors. For the two most recent political mandates, I also collected the full
list of candidates, the list of political parties supporting them, and the number and share of
votes that each candidate received.31 The data on the identities of district and vice-district
mayors, the dates of their appointment and the list of parties that supported them are coded
from documents from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The data on the list of candidates, the
coalition of parties supporting them and the number of votes and voting shares comes from
various sources. The large majority comes from official documents from the Ministry of Home
Affairs, newspapers and official local government websites.32
I use the data of these rounds of appointments to identify first and second-term politicians
elected in 2000-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014.
30The dataset shares some features with the dataset collected by Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee and Stegmann
(2016). The two datasets were collected independently. The main difference is the time coverage: their dataset
covers mayors’ identities up to 2007, i.e., until about halfway through the 2005-2009 round of elections; my
dataset also covers the local elections that took place during 2008-2014, i.e., about 700 additional elections.
31The list of political parties is also available for about half the district and vice-district mayors elected in
2000-2004.
32For a small share of the elections, I rely on online sources such as Wikipedia, quick counts and political
blogs. Whenever I rely on non-official sources, I validate the information by cross-checking it across two or
more separate sources.
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3.4 Summary statistics at the district level
There were 320 first-mandate district mayors elected in 2000-2004. Following the 2005-2009
elections, the same 320 districts had 133 first-term politicians and 187 second-term politicians.
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the entire sample of district-year combinations
used for the empirical analysis. Districts have, on average, half a million people. The local
bureaucracy (5,000 employees) is composed of 288 top bureaucrats, 1,405 administrative bu-
reaucrats and 3,453 front-line public service providers. The local bureaucracy is constantly
renovating: every year, there are about 250 new recruits (110 new administrators and 143
new front-line service providers); 3 percent of top bureaucrats are demoted and nearly 6
percent of administrators are promoted (promotions among front-line service providers are
less than 1 percent). In absolute numbers, the primary source of corruption within local
governments is administrators, followed by private agents (contractors), top bureaucrats and
politicians. Relative to its group size, the primary source of corruption among civil servants
is top bureaucrats.
4 Empirical strategy and main results
The identification strategy used in this paper is based on the fact that a large majority (88
percent) of the district mayors elected during the period 2000-2004 were at their first mandate,
partly because some of the districts had formed only recently (and therefore had never had a
mayor for an entire political mandate).33 I exploit this fact as follows: I restrict the sample
to districts that had first-term mayors elected in 2000-2004; among these districts, I separate
the districts whose mayor was replaced by another first-term mayor during the 2005-2009
round of elections from those whose mayor was reelected (and therefore hit the term limit); I
33The total number of districts in which a mayor was elected in 2000-2004 is 362. Among them, 72 are
newly formed districts, which means that this was their first politician in power for a full mandate. Among the
remaining 290 districts, the reappointment rate was 14 percent (42 out of 290), probably due to their association
with the Suharto regime that terminated in 1998. Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee and Stegmann (2016) exploit
the differential timing of the transition from Suharto-appointed to post-Suharto mayors to estimate the effect
of Suharto’s non-democratic legacy on current outcomes. Because my focus is on the difference between 1st
mandate and 2nd mandate politicians within the same “election-wave”, their source of variation is orthogonal
to mine.
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apply a difference-in-difference strategy by comparing these two types of districts before and
after the 2005-2009 elections. Restricting the sample to districts that, at the beginning of the
sample period, were governed by a district head at the first mandate (i.e., who could run for
reelection) should ensure that districts have similar initial conditions.34
Following this strategy, I include in the sample three years of data before the 2005-2009
elections. Table 5 shows a simple balance test based on district level data dating back to three
years before the 2005-2009 elections; the balance test compares districts that will have a 1st
mandate politician to districts that will have a 2nd mandate politician. The table shows that
the two groups are very similar along a wide range of important characteristics: population,
revenue and expenditure composition, size of the civil service, and number of promotions
and demotions. The comparison in terms of timing of elections suggests that 2nd mandate
politicians are slightly more likely to belong to districts that went through elections in 2008.
Because the effect of reelection incentives on corruption might vary over the political business
cycle, this slight difference in the timing of the elections suggests it might be safer to include
“election-wave”-year fixed effects in the specification (rather than the standard year fixed
effects).
The table shows some differences with respect to urban district status, number of recruits
and corruption among administrators. While this might give rise to some concerns about
the validity of the comparison, note that, in the empirical analysis, I will control for district
fixed effects, thereby controlling for any time-invariant differences between districts where the
politician can run for reelection and districts where the politician is hitting the term limit.
Another important point is that I include in the analysis enough pre-periods to estimate the
difference in trends between these two types of districts before the beginning of the mandate
on which I focus. These coefficient estimates represent a placebo test, because the sample is
restricted to district-mandate combinations preceded by 1st mandate politicians.
34Specifically, it ensures that the comparison between districts with politicians at the 1st vs 2nd mandate: i)
does not correspond to a comparison between newly formed vs older districts (because newly formed districts
would be experiencing their first elections, while older districts would not); ii) does not correspond to a
comparison between “districts formerly governed by a 1st mandate politician” vs “districts formerly governed
by a 2nd mandate politician”, which could bias the comparison if the effect of reelection incentives persisted
over time.
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The specification is slightly complicated by the fact that the local political business cycle
in Indonesia is not synchronized across districts. Let e ∈ {2005, 2006, 2007, 2008} indicate the
year of the elections.35 The sample period ranges from three years prior to the elections, up
to four year afterwards. Since elections take place at different times in different districts, the
sample period t ∈ [e − 2, e + 4], where year t ranges from 2002 to 2009 (for districts with
elections in 2005) and, for instance, from 2005 to 2012 (for districts with elections in 2008).36
Figure 1 provides an illustration. The specification is the following:
cedt = αd + Πet + βMedt + γ(Medt × Id)︸ ︷︷ ︸
main effect
+
−1∑
m=−2
[βmM
m
edt + γm(M
m
edt × Id)︸ ︷︷ ︸
placebo
] + εedt, (1)
where cedt is the number of corruption offences in district d at time t; αd are district fixed
effects; Πet are “election wave”-year fixed effects; Medt is a binary indicator taking the value
1 throughout all five years of the mandate of the politician elected in district d in “election
wave” e; Id is the time-invariant indicator for districts with a first-term mayor elected in
2005-2009; M
−1
edt and M
−2
edt are two binary variables indicating the first and second year before
the elections, respectively; and εedt is the error term. Standard errors are computed adjusting
for clustering at the district level.
The coefficient of interest is γ, which captures the effect of reelection incentives on cor-
ruption as long as no time-varying unobserved determinant of corruption is correlated with
the ability of a mayor to run for reelection (within the same “election-timing” group). As
mentioned before, the coefficients γ−1 and γ−2 will be important to validate this assumption.
In addition, I explicitly address the possibility that politicians who can run for reelection
differ from politicians hitting the term limit in terms of ability and experience. With respect
to (unobserved) differences in ability, I restrict the group of first-term politicians to future
35The large majority of districts went through elections in 2005 and 2008. Nearly all remaining districts
went through elections in 2006 and 2007. A few districts went through elections in 2009 because of various
delays in the implementation of the electoral process.
36Since the number of corruption offences becomes less accurate as the time gets closer to 2013, for most of
the analysis I keep 2011 as upper bound to the sample period. This choice is based on the fact that most of the
offences are prosecuted one, two or three years afterwards. While I believe that this threshold is reasonable,
one could make different choices. I reestimated the main specifications in this paper using, as alternative
thresholds, e + 3 and e + 4 (results available upon request).
17
winners. To the extent politicians’ ability is time-invariant, this should ensure that first-term
and second-term politicians have similar ability. With respect to (unobserved) differences in
experience, I control for the number of years in office (both in levels and squared). It will
also be possible to validate the assumption of no confounding effect of experience by looking
at the effect of reelection incentives over the political cycle: if the main effect is driven by
experience, then it should appear gradually over time. I relegate all other robustness checks
to Section 5.
4.1 Main results
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates associated with specification (1). Reelection incentives
are associated with a decrease in the number of corruption offences for all agents (Col. 1).
The effect is negative, large (-0.280) and precisely estimated. It corresponds to a 39 percent
decrease relative to the mean number of offences (0.716).37
The table shows the disaggregation by type of agent involved: politician (Col. 2), bureau-
crat (Col. 3), private agent (Col. 4), and unclassified (Col. 5). The estimates suggest that
the main effect is driven by bureaucrats (Col. 3): the coefficient estimate is negative, large
(-0.256) and precisely estimated. It corresponds to a 56 percent decrease relative to the mean
(0.459). The other categories show no effect. The absence of any effect before the elections
confirms that the effect is not driven by the district environment.
Following Section 2.2, I further disaggregate bureaucrats into: i) top bureaucrats, ii)
administrative bureaucrats, and iii) front-line civil servants (teachers, doctors and nurses).
Table 7 shows that the effect is driven by a decrease in corruption among top bureaucrats
(Col. 2) and administrative bureaucrats (Col. 3), while there is no effect associated with
front-line civil servants (Col. 4).
These results suggest that politicians’ incentives have a “deep” effect on the bureaucracy,
in the sense that they affect not only bureaucrats in direct contact with the politician, like
37This seems a large effect, but it is still consistent with the 27 percent decrease found by Ferraz and Finan
(2011) for Brazilian municipalities. In this respect, also note that, in Brazil, second-mandate politicians have
the possibility to run again for office after a one-term hiatus and, indeed, 12 percent of them do. In fact, the
authors note that they might have under-estimated the true effect of reelection incentives (Ferraz and Finan
2011:1281).
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the top bureaucrats, but also bureaucrats further down the hierarchy, like administrative bu-
reaucrats. In addition, the lack of any effect for front-line civil servants is consistent with the
need for physical proximity for the channel of transmission to work: administrative bureau-
crats are largely located in the headquarters, while the front-line civil servants are located in
schools, hospitals and health centers. I will more rigorously investigate possible channels of
transmission in Section 6.
Table A1 also shows the coefficient estimates associated with the control for experience
and ability. The effect of reelection incentives on bureaucrats’ corruption is still negative and
large, although the loss in sample size (due to the restriction of first-term politicians to future
winners only) generated a loss in the precision of the estimates.
5 Robustness checks
In this section, I discuss whether corruption might have influenced the selection into first-term
politicians (Section 5.1) and whether measurement error in the dependent variable might bias
the main estimates (Section 5.2).
5.1 The effect of corruption on the probability of reelection
One concern with this identification strategy is that corruption (or exposure of corruption)
might have determined who, among the first-mandate politicians in the baseline, was reelected.
Specifically, highly corrupt politicians might have been forced out of office by prosecutors
or by voters. In that case, either because of popular outrage, or because of some form
of mean reversion, corruption among the (new) first-mandate politicians might have ended
up being lower, not because of reelection incentives, but because of the political history of
the district. Alternatively, highly corrupt environments might be associated with greater (or
lower) persistence of politicians in power. This could bias the selection of politicians in power.
It could also make the difference between districts with first-term and second-term politicians
appear larger or smaller than it really is.
In order to test whether this concern is relevant in this context, I restrict the sample to
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first-mandate politicians and estimate the effect of corruption offences on the likelihood of
reelection. In addition, I disaggregate corruption offences according to whether they were
prosecuted before, during or after the forthcoming elections.
Because selection into “treatment” in this context concerns who, among the politicians
elected in 2000-2004, was reelected in 2005-2009, I estimate this effect first for the politi-
cians elected in 2000-2004. Table 8, Panel A, shows the results. Corruption (and corruption
prosecution) seems to have no effect on the probability of being first-term district mayor.
In addition, I repeat the same test for the politicians elected in 2005-2009. This should
suggest whether, during the political mandate on which I focus, politicians should expect
any electoral penalty from being corrupt (or being exposed). Panel B shows the results.
Corruption has a negative effect on the reelection of the first-mandate politicians (Col. 1-
5), but only when the offences are prosecuted during the political mandate (rather than
during the election year or afterward). The coefficient estimates show that the effect of
corruption on reelection (Col. 1) is -0.030 (relative to a mean of 0.538). The estimates also
suggest, importantly, that politicians care primarily about their own exposure: the exposure of
bureaucrats’ corruption does not seem to have electoral effects (Col. 6-10). This is important,
because it suggests that the politician might care about bureaucrats’ corruption as a signal
of public service inefficiency, rather than as political risk per se.
5.2 Testing for manipulation of prosecutors’ activity
In Section 2.3, I explained that prosecutors are independent from local governments and
respond solely to provincial prosecutors’ offices (which, in turn, respond solely to the General
Attorney Office in Jakarta). Nonetheless, one might wonder whether politicians with or
without reelection incentives put pressure on prosecutors, or whether prosecutors themselves
target politicians with or without reelection incentives because they expect more corruption,
or whether the intensity of the citizens’ complaints relative to true corruption differs between
the two.
Let pi be the probability of prosecution. Borrowing from Lo¨chner and Moretti (2004), I
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write the relationship between observed and true corruption as follows:
cedt = pic
TRUE
edt ,
so that
d ln(cedt)
d(Id)
=
d lnpi
d(Id)
+
d ln(cTRUEedt )
d(Id)
where Id indicates the strength of reelection incentives as defined earlier. This expression
makes clear that d ln(cedt)d(Id) =
d ln(cTRUEedt )
d(Id)
if and only if d lnpid(Id) = 0.
One can think of various mechanisms that might generate a correlation between reelec-
tion incentives and prosecution of an offence. Two obvious mechanisms are the following.
First, politicians might collude with prosecutors. Politicians with reelection incentives have
more incentives to collude with prosecutors than do politicians without reelections incen-
tives. Collusion might lead to some offences not being prosecuted at all, or to some delays in
the prosecutions. In this case, the effect of reelection incentives on corruption (presumably
negative) would suffer from a downward bias. Second, prosecutors might target politicians.
Prosecutors might choose to devote more effort to cases involving politicians with reelection
incentives (to prevent corrupt politicians from being reelected), since politicians without re-
election incentives will soon leave office anyway. In this case, the effect of reelection incentives
on corruption (presumably negative) would suffer from an upward bias. In order to test how
severe this concern is, I adopt two strategies. First, I test whether reelection incentives have
an effect on the speed of prosecution of offences that were eventually prosecuted. This can
be thought of as a test for manipulation on the “intensive margin,” strong enough to delay
but not to prevent prosecution. Evidence of such manipulation would lead one to presume
manipulation on the “extensive margin” (i.e., offences that took place and were never pros-
ecuted). Second, I control directly for manipulation on the extensive margin by controlling
for time-varying differences across and within prosecutors’ offices as well as by using only
district-year combinations associated with active prosecutors’ offices.
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5.2.1 Testing for manipulation on the intensive margin
Recall that the benchmark measure of corruption is the number of corruption offences in a
given district during the year when the offence took place and not during the year when
it was prosecuted. In this subsection, I use both dates to estimate the effect of reelection
incentives on the probability that a case is prosecuted in a given period. I estimate a discrete-
time hazard model separately for offences that took place in districts where the politician
was facing reelection incentives, and offences associated with politicians without reelection
incentives. Figure 2 shows that the baseline hazard function for the cases associated with
politicians with reelection incentives lies above the one associated with politicians without
incentives, but the difference is small. The lack of evidence on manipulation of prosecutors’
activity is confirmed by the disaggregation of the survival analysis by proximity to elections
(Figure 3).
5.2.2 Controlling for manipulation on the extensive margin
The evidence in the previous subsection is reassuring: to the extent the mechanisms driving
the manipulation along the intensive and extensive margin are the same, the analysis in the
previous subsection tells us that we may not worry about the extensive margin either.
In this subsection, I suggest an additional way to address these concerns. I exploit the
date of the offence and the date of the prosecution in a different way: I disaggregate the
measure of corruption with respect to the district (d), the year when it took place (t) and the
year in which it was prosecuted (the “prosecution year,” p). Correspondingly, I disaggregate
specification (1) from the district (d)-year(t) level to the district (t) - year (t) - prosecution
year (p) level. In practice, this means that each district-year combination will now have a
number of observations equal to the number of prosecution years after that. For district-year
combinations in 2008 (or earlier), there will be six observations (2008-2013); for combinations
in 2009, there will be five (2009-2013); for combinations in 2010, there will be four (2010-2013);
for combinations in 2011, there will be three (2011-2013).38
38Notwithstanding the extremely short time available to prosecute offences that took place in 2012, I also
estimated specification including that year. The estimates are very similar (results available upon request).
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The corresponding specification is:
cedtp = αd + Πet + βMedt + γ(Medt × Id)︸ ︷︷ ︸
main effect
+
−1∑
m=−2
[βmM
m
edt + γm(M
m
edt × Id)︸ ︷︷ ︸
placebo
] + Υedp + εedtp,
(2)
where Υedp is a prosecutors’ office-prosecution year fixed effect.
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Estimates at this level of disaggregation provide me with two key advantages. First, I can
control for prosecution year fixed effects. This controls for possible changes in prosecutors’
technology over time. Alternatively, I can even control for prosecution year - district fixed
effects. This controls for time-varying differences in corruption law enforcement across districts
and, within districts, over prosecution year.
Second, it allows me to test for some form of manipulation of prosecutors’ activity along
the extensive margin. After controlling for prosecutors’ office - prosecution year fixed ef-
fects, prosecutors might have avoided prosecuting recent corruption offences (and prosecuted
nothing). In this case, collusion between the politician and the prosecutor generates under-
reporting of corruption, which, in turn, generates a downward bias on the estimates. While I
cannot completely rule out this possibility, I can identify prosecutors’ offices that, in a given
prosecution year, reported no offences. In these unusually inactive offices, it could be that
the prosecutors came to know about some corruption offence, but chose not to prosecute. As
a robustness check I will drop prosecutors’ office - prosecution year combinations associated
with no offences, testing whether these offices are driving the main estimates.
Another possibility is that prosecutors shifted their attention from recent to earlier corrup-
tion. In this case, collusion generates under-reporting of recent corruption and over-reporting
of earlier corruption. If this is the case, then the placebo estimates should signal a positive
effect of reelection incentives on corruption before the elections actually took place.
Overall, controlling for prosecutors’ office - prosecution year fixed effects, dropping prose-
cutors’ office-“prosecution year” combinations associated with no prosecution, and estimating
39District prosecutors are in charge of offences that took place on their own territory. Hence, prosecutors’
office-“prosecution year” fixed effects coincide with district-“prosecution year” fixed effects.
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placebo effects should constitute a rather strong test of manipulation of prosecutors’ activity.
Table 9 shows the effect of reelection incentives on bureaucrats’ corruption at the district-
year-“prosecution year” level for all bureaucrats (Col. 1-3), top bureaucrats (Col. 4-6) and
administrative bureaucrats (Col. 7-9). At this level of disaggregation, I can control for
“prosecution year” fixed effects (Col. 1,4 and 7) or even prosecutors’ office-“prosecution
year” fixed effects (Col. 2-3,5-6, 8-9). When controlling for “prosecution year” fixed effects,
the effect is negative and large for all three categories (with the effect corresponding to a 38,
27 and 48 percent decrease relative to the mean), but it is generally imprecisely estimated.
Results are almost identical when I control for prosecutors’ office-“prosecution year” fixed
effects (Col. 2, 5 and 8). When I also drop prosecutors’ office-“prosecution year” combinations
with no offences (Col. 3,6 and 9), the effect is also large (with the effect corresponding to a
54, 63 and 62 percent decrease relative to the mean), but it is much more precisely estimated.
The robustness of the main estimates to this restriction reinforces the lack of evidence of
manipulation on the intensive margin (Section 4.2.1). Both tests suggest that such manipu-
lation, if it exists, is not driving the main results.
Table A2 shows the coefficient estimates associated with the same specification, jointly
with the control for ability and experience. While this test cannot rule out that some form of
manipulation of prosecutors’ activity did take place, mechanisms explaining the estimates in
Tables 6 and 7 in terms of manipulated corruption law enforcement should also explain the
lack of evidence reported by both the discrete-time hazard model (Figure 2 and 3) and the
robustness test here (Table 9 and A2).
6 Mechanisms
In this section, I discuss two potential mechanisms through which the effect of politicians’
reelection incentives may affect bureaucrats’ corruption. First, I look at changes in the number
of promotions and demotions. Second, I investigate changes in the level and composition of
local public expenditure.
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6.1 Mechanism (1): changes in the composition of top bureaucrats
Reelection incentives might affect the politician’s choice over the level and composition of
the bureaucracy. The politician has the power to influence the level and composition of top
bureaucrats. She can use that power to manipulate career concerns (Holmstro¨m 1999) among
both top bureaucrats (fearing demotion) and low-level bureaucrats (hoping for promotion).
Before discussing the effect of reelection incentives on promotions and demotions, I will
disaggregate the effect of reelection incentives on corruption over the political business cycle.
Table 10 indicates that the effect for all bureaucrats (Col. 1) is negative, large and precisely
estimated for all the different phases of the political cycle, except for the last year before the
new elections. The effect for administrative bureaucrats (Col. 3) shows a similar pattern,
while the effect for top bureaucrats (Col. 2) is weak at the beginning and, overall, more
concentrated during the middle of the political cycle.
With respect to promotions and demotions, I estimate a specification similar to (1), where
the only difference is the dependent variable, which is now promotions and demotions instead
of corruption. Given the structure of local bureaucracies in this context, I measure promotions
as “any switch from administrative/front-line position to top/managerial (Eselon) position).
Demotions are similarly defined as “any switch to a lower level”.40
Table 11 shows the coefficient estimates associated with the demotions of top bureaucrats
(Col. 1), promotions of administrative staff (Col. 2) and promotions of teachers, doctors and
nurses (Col. 3). All estimates are in per capita terms and in percentage points. The estimates
for demotions of top bureaucrats indicate a positive, large and precisely estimated increase in
demotions during the election year and the first year afterward. The estimates (0.986 during
the election year and 0.963 during the first year of the political cycle) correspond to an increase
of 32 and 31 percent relative to the mean (3.075). The effect is also relatively large during
40Note that this definition of promotions and demotions differs substantially from the definition given to
promotions in Mukherjee (2014). There, she considers changes in the rank (Golongan) of a civil servant. The
rank of a civil servant is important, because it is one of the determinants of the basic salary (together with years
of experience). However, an increase in rank does not per se constitute an increase or change in responsibilities
in office or even a change in job description. In addition, rank promotions are de jure and de facto separated
by eselon promotions, where the former is typically driven by regular promotions determined by seniority and
the latter is driven by an application and screening process managed by the Human Resource Department. In
this sense, I believe that the definition given here is closer to the common sense definition of promotions.
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the second year of the political mandate (0.538), but it is far from statistically significant.
The estimates for promotions of administrative bureaucrats also indicate an increase. The
increase is positive and large for the election year and the two years afterward (0.926, 1.335 and
1.015), although only the effect one year after the elections is precisely estimated. The effects
correspond to 16, 23 and 18 percent increases relative to the mean (5.746). Promotions also
increase for front-line service providers (Col. 3), but the estimates are much noisier, perhaps
because promotions are less common for them (the unconditional likelihood of promotion is
0.217 percentage points for them). For these civil servants, there is an increase of about 45
percent relative to the mean during the second year of the political mandate.
It is important to note that, while the effect of reelection incentives on demotions of top
bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats (and front-line service providers)
seems symmetric, the absolute numbers of promotions and demotions do not add up. This
is simply due to the fact that there are many more administrative bureaucrats than top
bureaucrats; therefore, a percentage increase in demotions of top bureaucrats will be much
smaller in absolute numbers than a percentage increase in promotions of administrative bu-
reaucrats. Hence, these changes could be accompanied by either an increase in retirements
of top bureaucrats or an increase in the size of the top layer of the local bureaucracy. While
I cannot observe retirement decisions, I can observe the evolution of the size of each layer of
the bureaucracy.
Table 12 shows the effect of reelection incentives on the size of each layer. In order to
check whether changes are driven by promotions and demotions or by recruitment decisions,
I separate the size of the bottom two layers (administrative, as opposed to front-line service
providers) depending on seniority. Col. 1 shows the effect on the size of the top bureaucracy;
Col. 2 and 3 show the effect on the number of bureaucrats (or front-line service providers)
with at least five years of experience; and Col. 4 and 5 show the effect on the number of
new bureaucrats (or front-line service providers). Table 12 shows only small, never precisely
estimated, variations in the size of any layer. This suggests that the composition of the top
bureaucracy was accompanied, at least partially, by an increase in retirements.
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Overall, Tables 10 and 11 suggest that reelection incentives increased the turnover among
top bureaucratic positions and that this change followed roughly the same timing as the de-
crease in corruption that I showed in the previous section. This can be seen more clearly in
Figures 4-7, which show the effect of reelection incentives on administrative bureaucrats’ cor-
ruption and promotions (Figures 3-4)41 as well as top bureaucrats’ corruption and demotions
(Figures 6-7).42 This suggests that the two phenomena are connected.
6.2 Mechanism (2): a political business cycle explanation
Reelection incentives might lead the incumbent to change the level and composition of public
goods. The most obvious way to do that is to change the level and/or composition of local
public expenditure. Local governments in Indonesia have very limited room to change the
level of revenues (since the tax revenue from own sources amounts, on average, to only 15
percent of their budget). Hence, I do not expect an effect along that dimension. However,
local governments might still affect the level of local expenditure, at the margin, by creating
debt (or decreasing their savings). It is not clear how much room local governments have for
this type of intervention, but the local budget figures do show some non-zero level of surplus
and deficit.
Table 13 shows the effect of reelection incentives on revenue (Col. 1), total expenditure
(Col. 2) and sectoral expenditure (Col. 3-9). Sectoral expenditure is divided along the
“economic” dimension (Col. 3-6) and the “functional” dimension (Col. 7-9). Along the
economic dimension, expenditure is divided into expenditures for personnel (Col. 3), capital
(Col. 4), goods and services (Col. 5) and other (Col. 6). Along the functional dimension,
expenditure is divided into expenditures for administrative purposes (Col. 7), education (Col.
8) and infrastructure (Col. 9).43
41Figure 4 shows the effect on number of offences for every 3,000 bureaucrats versus the effect on the
number of promotions for every 100 bureaucrats, while Figure 5 shows the effect on number of offences versus
the number of promotions for every 100 bureaucrats. Using offences per bureaucrat introduces yet another
source of noise in the data. However, it facilitates the comparison of the effect on corruption versus the effect
on promotions.
42The difference between Figures 6 and 7 is similar to the difference between Figures 4 and 5. See the
previous footnote.
43The local government expenditure data include many more categories along the functional dimension. For
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Consistent with the limited room that local governments have to manoeuvre their revenue,
the effect on revenue (Col. 1) is generally positive, but relatively small and never statistically
significant. In contrast, when it comes to total expenditure (Col. 2), the effect is also generally
positive, but it is larger than that for revenue, particularly so during the last year before the
elections (0.261), when it is also precisely estimated.44 The effect corresponds to a 13 percent
increase relative to the mean.
The coefficient estimates associated with the various sectoral expenditure components do
not show clear patterns: along the economic dimension, there is a (weak) effect on personnel
and “other” expenditure during the last period before elections; along the functional dimen-
sion, there is a precisely estimated effect for administrative expenditure (0.150). The effect
corresponds to a 21 percent increase in expenditure relative to the mean (0.707). Again, the
effect is limited to the last year before the forthcoming elections.
Overall, it seems that any effect of reelection incentives on the level and composition of
public expenditure exists only when it comes to the last period before the next election. While
interesting, these effects do not seem capable of explaining the bulk of the effects of corruption
shown in earlier tables. In particular, the disaggregation of the effect on corruption over the
political cycle suggests that the effect is not driven by pre-election campaigning.
7 Conclusion
One of the cornerstones of Weberian civil service reforms is internal promotions and bureau-
cratic insulation from politicians. In this paper, I consider a setting where promotions are
internal but politicians retain some influence over their timing.
By assembling a unique dataset on corruption, promotions and demotions for more than
4 million civil servants, as well as a two-decade long panel on district mayors in Indonesia, I
am able to link the behaviour of bureaucrats to the electoral incentives of politicians.
presentation purposes, I report here only the three biggest categories. These three categories alone constitute
82 percent of total expenditure.
44While the individual coefficient estimate is precisely estimated, the difference with the placebo effect is
not. Hence, the result is not very robust.
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I find that reelection incentives alter the corruption behaviour of both top and low-level
bureaucrats, which constitutes evidence of the deep, far-reaching effects of politicians’ ac-
countability on local civil servants. I then explore a mechanism where bureaucrats have
career concerns and politicians facing reelection manipulate such concerns by increasing the
turnover of top bureaucrats. Consistent with this mechanism, I find that reelection incentives
increase demotions of top bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats.
This is the first paper to show that politicians’ influence over the bureaucracy can go
beyond the top bureaucrats and reach administrative bureaucrats. It is also the first to show
that bureaucrats’ corruption responds to politicians’ incentives.
These findings are broadly in line with recent evidence suggesting that top bureaucrats
are particularly important for economic outcomes (Bertrand et al. 2016) and that, while
meritocratic recruitment is unambiguously good, insulation of promotions from politicians’
influence is more controversial (Rauch and Evans 2000).45 These results call for wider research
on how civil service institutions shape the effect of political institutions on the selection and
incentives of bureaucrats.
Accounting for heterogeneity in civil service institutions might be especially useful to
advance our understanding of the economic performance of newly democratized countries,
which is when civil service institutions are most likely to persist (Acemoglu, Ticchi and
Vindigni 2011).
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Tables
Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS CORRUPTION OFFENCES
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Duration of the offence
Number of years 1141 0.64 1.33 0 12
Offence lasted 0-1 years 1141 0.70 0.46 0 1
Offence lasted 1-2 years 1141 0.15 0.36 0 1
Offence lasted >2 years 1141 0.15 0.36 0 1
Number of defendants
Number of defendants 1141 1.31 0.88 1 14
Offence with 1 defendant 1141 0.81 0.39 0 1
Offence with 2 defendants 1141 0.12 0.33 0 1
Offence with >2 defendants 1141 0.06 0.25 0 1
Occupation defendant
Politician 1141 0.11 0.32 0 2
District head 1141 0.03 0.16 0 1
Vice District head 1141 0.00 0.06 0 1
Village head 1141 0.07 0.25 0 1
Bureaucrat 1141 0.66 0.54 0 2
Top Bureaucrat 1141 0.21 0.41 0 1
Administrative 1141 0.33 0.47 0 1
Front-line service providers 1141 0.12 0.32 0 1
Private agent 1141 0.31 0.46 0 1
Unclear 1141 0.06 0.24 0 1
Source of the funds
District 1141 0.62 0.49 0 1
Sub-district 1141 0.05 0.21 0 1
Village 1141 0.23 0.42 0 1
Unclear 1141 0.11 0.31 0 1
Law Enforcement
Time to prosecute
Time to prosecute (years) 1141 3.06 2.10 0 13
Prosecuted same year 1141 0.03 0.18 0 1
Prosecuted 1 year later 1141 0.20 0.40 0 1
Prosecuted 2 years later 1141 0.26 0.44 0 1
Prosecuted 3 years later 1141 0.19 0.39 0 1
Prosecuted >3 years later 1141 0.32 0.47 0 1
Prosecution stage 924 0.35 0.48 0 1
Court stage 924 0.68 0.47 0 1
Source: corruption offences from AGO and KPK.
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Table 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS SIZE OF THE CORRUPTION OFFENCES
Variable N Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Offences with nonmissing project size and embezzlement amounts
Project size 200 49,750 993,147 9,007,226 0 126,370,000
Embezzlement 200 17,981 80,858 239,829 25 2,165,000
Offences with nonmissing embezzlement amount
- by anybody 543 20,014 138,748 531,633 10 6,413,708
- by politicians 61 105,385 575,548 1,264,958 200 6,413,708
- by bureaucrats 314 17,813 83,997 300,011 25 3,744,990
- by top bureaucrats 113 22,915 77,375 150,538 25 796,906
- by admin. bureaucrats 166 22,982 109,126 391,525 172 3,744,990
- by front-line providers 71 7,693 14,186 26,095 400 165,000
- by private agents 163 17,990 73,552 291,314 10 3,160,136
- by unclassified 32 22,986 79,320 128,901 100 615,067
Note: Corruption offences from AGO and KPK. All amounts in this table are in USD (converted
using a 1 USD=10,000 IDR exchange rate).
Table 3: CORRELATION WITH AUDIT IRREGULARITIES
Dependent variable number of corruption offences affecting the district budget
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
audit irregularities (any) 0.015** 0.011**
(0.007) (0.006)
ln(audit irregularities (any)) 0.184** 0.097
(0.086) (0.069)
audit irregularities (corruption) 0.019 0.020*
(0.015) (0.011)
ln(audit irregularities (corruption)) 0.121* 0.101*
(0.063) (0.053)
Observations 977 977 977 977 977 977 913 913
R-squared 0.091 0.057 0.091 0.054 0.087 0.056 0.085 0.057
Mean dep. variable 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.542 0.542
Mean expl. variable 13.78 13.78 13.78 13.78 4.449 4.449 4.761 4.761
Number of districts 320 320 320 320 320 320 318 318
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Unit FE province district province district province district province district
Note: the audit irregularities are based on audits of district budget reports. Corruption offences based on corruption prosecutions
are restricted to offences affecting the district budget.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS DISTRICTS
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Population 2430 562255.79 563190.48 28970 4179163
Urban district 2430 0.22 0.41 0 1
District with province capital 2430 0.08 0.27 0 1
Revenue
total 2411 2.14 2.21 0.27 37.49
main grant (DAU) 2338 1.21 1.23 0.00 35.82
tax sharing 2316 0.20 0.56 0.00 15.55
natural resource sharing 2430 0.31 1.05 0.00 12.67
own sources 2332 0.13 0.17 0.00 2.33
Expenditure
total 2149 2.06 2.02 0.01 21.41
personnel 2145 0.85 0.62 0.01 6.69
capital 2133 0.65 0.97 0.00 11.05
goods and services 2133 0.40 0.47 0.00 7.45
other 2092 0.18 0.25 0.00 3.45
administration 2063 0.71 0.96 0.01 16.30
education 2046 0.55 0.53 0.00 18.19
infrastructure 2043 0.43 0.82 0.00 17.35
Local GDP 2430 14.18 19.92 1.13 373.17
Civil servants (stock)
All 2430 5145.75 2903.88 619 21536
Top Bureaucrats 2430 287.74 163.47 32 1283
Administrative bureaucrats 2430 1405.44 701.76 240 5949
Front-line service providers 2430 3452.88 2200.81 244 17185
Civil servants (flow)
Admin. bureaucrats (recruits) 2430 109.62 138.99 0 1477
Front-line providers (recruits) 2430 143.42 199.91 0 1759
Demotions Top bureaucrats 2430 3.08 2.73 0.00 20.59
Promotions Admin. bureaucrats 2430 5.75 5.80 0.00 41.92
Promotions Front-line providers 2430 0.22 0.33 0.00 4.68
Corruption (number of offences)
Any 2430 0.69 1.34 0 17
Politicians 2430 0.07 0.31 0 4
Bureaucrats 2430 0.46 0.95 0 8
Top Bureaucrats 2430 0.14 0.43 0 4
Administrative bureaucrats 2430 0.23 0.60 0 6
Front-line service providers 2430 0.09 0.37 0 7
Private agents 2430 0.22 0.65 0 13
Unclear 2430 0.03 0.21 0 3
Corruption (Suryadarma 2013, JDE)
Missing funds 1668 0.73 1.00 0.00 10.90
Missing funds (weighted) 1668 0.82 1.23 0.00 12.62
Note: revenue, expenditure and local GDP are in real per capita terms; demotions and pro-
motions of civil servants are percentages over the population of civil servants with five or more
years of experience. The missing fund indicators from Suryadarma (2013, JDE) are the lower
bound versions. Using the upper bound indicators provides similar differences.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS DISTRICTS 3 YEARS BEFORE ELECTIONS
1st mandate 2nd mandate diff t-stat Observations
Population 527 064 578 202 -51 138 (-0.818) 320
Urban district 0,16 0,27 -0,11 (-2.335) ** 320
District with province capital 0,06 0,09 -0,03 (-1.009) 320
Revenue
total 1,60 1,62 -0,02 (-0.130) 315
main grant (DAU) 0,96 0,93 0,03 (0.374) 296
tax sharing 0,13 0,14 -0,01 (-0.649) 296
natural resource sharing 0,23 0,24 -0,01 (-0.121) 320
own sources 0,09 0,10 -0,01 (-0.781) 296
Expenditure
total 1,45 1,44 0,00 (0.024) 296
personnel 0,61 0,59 0,02 (0.415) 296
capital 0,36 0,38 -0,02 (-0.243) 292
goods and services 0,33 0,35 -0,03 (-0.402) 292
other 0,17 0,13 0,03 (1.061) 291
administrative 0,54 0,55 -0,01 (-0.111) 292
education 0,40 0,38 0,03 (0.952) 289
infrastructure 0,21 0,24 -0,03 (-0.709) 288
Local GDP 10,26 13,76 -3,50 (-1.466) 320
Civil servants (stock)
All 3 984 4 182 -198 (-0.714) 320
Top Bureaucrats 179,29 176,78 2,51 (0.268) 320
Administrative bureaucrats 1 040 1 091 -51 (-0.860) 320
Teacher/Doctor/Nurse 2 765 2 915 -150 (-0.684) 320
Civil servants (flow)
Recruits (admin bureaucrats) 13,80 20,81 -7,02 (-1.852) * 320
Recruits (teacher/doctor/nurse) 32,08 48,73 -16,65 (-1.924) * 320
Demotions Top Bureaucrats* 3,07 2,94 0,12 (0.434) 320
Promotions Admin Bureaucrats* 2,38 2,67 -0,29 (-1.151) 320
Promotions Teacher/Doctor/Nurse* 0,09 0,09 0,00 (-0.248) 320
Number of corruption offences
All 0.23 0.18 0.049 (0.778) 320
Politicians 0.02 0.04 -0.015 (-0.752) 320
Bureaucrats 0,15 0,09 0,06 (1.372) 320
Top Bureaucrats 0,03 0,04 -0,01 (-0.355) 320
Administrative bureaucrats 0,11 0,04 0,08 (2.161) ** 320
Front-line service providers 0,01 0,02 -0,01 (-0.675) 320
Private agents 0,06 0,07 -0,01 (-0.254) 320
Unclear 0,02 0,00 0,02 (1.684) * 320
Missing funds (Suryadarma 2013)
Missing funds 0,77 0,71 0,06 (0.462) 220
Missing funds, weighted 0,80 0,84 -0,03 (-0.200) 220
Timing elections
in 2005 0,41 0,37 0,03 (0.572) 320
in 2006 0,18 0,17 0,02 (0.342) 320
in 2007 0,17 0,09 0,08 (2.014) ** 320
in 2008 0,17 0,28 -0,11 (-2.301) ** 320
in 2009 0,07 0,09 -0,02 (-0.586) 320
in 2010 0,01 0,00 0,01 (1.187) 320
Number of districts 133 187
Note: This table presents a comparison of the mean characteristics of the districts between first- and second-term mayors.
These statistics were computed only for the 320 districts included in the regression analysis 3 years before the 2005-2009
elections. Column 1 reports the means for the districts with a first-term mayor. Column 2 reports the mean for the districts
with second-term mayors. Column 3 reports the difference in means. Column 4 shows the t-statistic associated with the
diff-in-mean test. Revenue, expenditure and local GDP are in real per capita terms; demotions and promotions of civil
servants are percentages over the population of civil servants with five or more years of experience. The missing fund
indicators from Suryadarma (2013, JDE) are the lower bound versions. Using the upper bound indicators provides similar
differences.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer All Politician Bureaucrat Private Unclear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medt × Id -0.280** -0.005 -0.256*** -0.058 -0.012
(0.135) (0.029) (0.085) (0.069) (0.015)
M−1edt × Id 0.047 0.023 0.017 -0.035 -0.001
(0.143) (0.033) (0.113) (0.054) (0.022)
M−2edt × Id -0.001 0.024 -0.057 -0.006 0.014
(0.086) (0.026) (0.067) (0.027) (0.017)
F-test: Medt × Id=M−1edt × Id 7.086 0.754 6.875 0.119 0.298
P-value 0.008 0.386 0.009 0.731 0.586
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430
R-squared 0.149 0.030 0.116 0.073 0.063
Mean 0.707 0.074 0.459 0.218 0.035
Number of districts 320 320 320 320 320
Control for Medt, M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed by any or a specific type
of agent. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009
elections. Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M
−1
edt is a
binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M−2edt is a binary indicator taking
value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient
estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection
incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate starting
between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION: BUREAUCRATS ONLY
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer Any bureaucrat Top Bureaucrat Administrative Front-line service providers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medt × Id -0.256*** -0.079** -0.155*** -0.023
(0.085) (0.036) (0.055) (0.037)
M−1edt × Id 0.017 -0.023 0.009 0.031
(0.113) (0.056) (0.066) (0.036)
M−2edt × Id -0.057 -0.030 -0.010 -0.017
(0.067) (0.035) (0.050) (0.022)
F-test: Medt × Id=M−1edt × Id 6.875 0.862 5.487 1.888
P-value 0.009 0.354 0.020 0.170
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430
R-squared 0.116 0.046 0.082 0.042
Mean 0.459 0.139 0.233 0.088
Number of districts 320 320 320 320
Control for Medt, M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed by any or a specific type of agent. Medt is a time-
varying indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections. Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term
politicians elected in 2005-2009. M−1edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a binary
indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show
the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1).
The sample covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON REELECTION
Offences committed by Politicians Bureaucrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PANEL A: POLITICAL MANDATE STARTED IN 2000-2004
Number of offences 0.006 -0.019
(0.010) (0.013)
..prosecuted before elections -0.051 -0.096 0.052 0.041
(0.093) (0.210) (0.270) (0.251)
..prosecuted during elections -0.046 -0.033 -0.036 -0.031
(0.083) (0.185) (0.068) (0.067)
..prosecuted after elections 0.010 0.019* -0.018 -0.018
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320
R-squared 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.155 0.160 0.158 0.153 0.154 0.158 0.158
Mean dep. 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578
Mean expl. 0.556 0.025 0.041 0.491 1.025 0.013 0.078 0.934
PANEL B: POLITICAL MANDATE STARTED IN 2005-2009
Number of offences -0.030** -0.005
(0.012) (0.008)
..prosecuted before elections -0.109*** -0.138*** -0.014 -0.006
(0.025) (0.036) (0.011) (0.016)
..prosecuted during elections -0.042 0.126 -0.054* -0.062
(0.064) (0.084) (0.031) (0.045)
..prosecuted after elections -0.040 -0.034 0.023 0.036**
(0.035) (0.055) (0.019) (0.016)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.022 0.047 0.003 0.008 0.058 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.007 0.032
Mean dep. 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538
Mean expl. 0.682 0.242 0.174 0.265 2.568 1.235 0.538 0.795
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
“Election-year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the first-term politician is reelected in the forthcoming elections. In Panel
A, the politicians were elected in 2000-2004 and could run for reelection in 2005-2009. In Panel B, the politicians were elected in 2005-2009 and
could run for reelection in 2010-2014. Prosecuted “before”, “during” and “after” refers to the forthcoming elections. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION CONTROLLING FOR PROSECUTORS’ ACTIVITY
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer Any bureaucrat Top Bureaucrat Administrative Front-line service providers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Medt × Id -0.034* -0.033 -0.117*** -0.008 -0.009 -0.043** -0.021* -0.021* -0.069*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.006
(0.019) (0.021) (0.038) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.026) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018)
M−1edt × Id 0.014 0.014 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.016 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.015
(0.024) (0.025) (0.050) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.012) (0.013) (0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017)
M−2edt × Id -0.008 -0.008 -0.030 -0.004 -0.004 -0.017 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007
(0.014) (0.015) (0.031) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
F-test: Medt × Id=M−1edt × Id 5.659 5.036 6.362 0.588 0.624 0.855 5.000 4.389 4.472 2.023 1.385 1.375
P-value3 0.018 0.026 0.012 0.444 0.430 0.356 0.026 0.037 0.035 0.156 0.240 0.242
Observations 13,445 13,445 5,067 13,445 13,445 5,067 13,445 13,445 5,067 13,445 13,445 5,067
R-squared 0.026 0.272 0.238 0.011 0.213 0.185 0.018 0.281 0.249 0.009 0.302 0.262
Mean 0.090 0.090 0.220 0.030 0.030 0.068 0.044 0.044 0.110 0.016 0.016 0.042
Number of districts 320 320 244 320 320 244 320 320 244 320 320 244
Control for Medt, M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
“Prosecution year” FE YES YES YES YES
“Prosecution year”-district FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Drop “Prosecution year”-district with no offence YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed in district d, time t and prosecuted in year p. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started with
the 2005-2009 elections. Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M
−1
edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a
binary indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ)
and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The main difference from Table 7 and 8 is the inclusion of “prosecution year” (Υpt) or “prosecution year”-district
(Υed,pt) FE. See equation (2) and explanations in the text. The last line indicates specifications dropping district-prosecution year combinations associated with no prosecution. The sample
covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION OVER THE ELECTORAL CYCLE
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer Any bureaucrat Top Bureaucrat Administrative Front-line servide providers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
M+4edt × Id -0.069 -0.012 -0.047 -0.010
(0.127) (0.061) (0.100) (0.053)
M+3edt × Id -0.332** -0.053 -0.219** -0.060
(0.144) (0.067) (0.089) (0.057)
M+2edt × Id -0.311** -0.140*** -0.202*** 0.031
(0.132) (0.053) (0.076) (0.077)
M+1edt × Id -0.283*** -0.117** -0.099 -0.068*
(0.100) (0.048) (0.064) (0.037)
M0edt × Id -0.233** -0.049 -0.178** -0.006
(0.102) (0.050) (0.072) (0.037)
M−1edt × Id 0.017 -0.023 0.009 0.031
(0.113) (0.056) (0.066) (0.036)
M−2edt × Id -0.057 -0.030 -0.010 -0.017
(0.067) (0.035) (0.050) (0.022)
P-value: M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.544 0.888 0.607 0.476
P-value: M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.032 0.719 0.026 0.124
P-value: M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.012 0.109 0.024 0.996
P-value: M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.014 0.172 0.151 0.025
P-value: M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.043 0.697 0.017 0.339
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430
R-squared 0.118 0.048 0.085 0.044
Mean 0.459 0.139 0.233 0.088
Number of districts 320 320 320 320
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed by any or a specific type of agent. Medt is a time-varying
indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1st year
of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M
−1
edt is a binary indicator
for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M−2edt is a binary indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections.
The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of
reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008
and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON REVENUE, TOTAL AND SECTORAL EXPENDITURE
Dep. variable Revenue Expenditure
Category Economic Functional
Sub-category Total Total Personnel Capital Goods and Services Other Admin Education Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
M+4edt × Id 0.129 0.261** 0.093 0.094 0.041 0.023 0.150** 0.024 0.081
(0.111) (0.122) (0.058) (0.063) (0.038) (0.023) (0.071) (0.036) (0.062)
M+3edt × Id 0.078 0.152 0.025 0.130 -0.003 -0.001 -0.048 -0.081 0.062
(0.110) (0.138) (0.061) (0.088) (0.036) (0.021) (0.096) (0.096) (0.117)
M+2edt × Id 0.066 0.097 0.039 0.029 0.021 -0.003 0.081 -0.007 0.074
(0.095) (0.129) (0.047) (0.095) (0.032) (0.019) (0.051) (0.037) (0.094)
M+1edt × Id 0.022 0.190 0.046 0.110 0.045 -0.029 0.048 0.023 0.117*
(0.092) (0.126) (0.047) (0.078) (0.038) (0.025) (0.078) (0.034) (0.069)
M0edt × Id -0.057 0.084 0.013 0.025 0.049 -0.015 0.024 0.023 -0.002
(0.205) (0.112) (0.031) (0.084) (0.039) (0.022) (0.073) (0.027) (0.069)
M−1edt × Id 0.076 0.084 -0.015 0.086* 0.030 -0.027 -0.000 0.026 0.039
(0.068) (0.083) (0.030) (0.044) (0.037) (0.023) (0.056) (0.023) (0.041)
M−2edt × Id -0.006 -0.051 -0.030 -0.019 0.006 0.001 -0.053 -0.017 0.002
(0.051) (0.058) (0.026) (0.033) (0.017) (0.023) (0.044) (0.016) (0.038)
M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.654 0.168 0.053 0.891 0.769 0.086 0.030 0.959 0.459
M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.987 0.647 0.493 0.576 0.346 0.225 0.648 0.268 0.832
M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.916 0.925 0.212 0.541 0.763 0.278 0.126 0.370 0.667
M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.509 0.366 0.181 0.727 0.670 0.953 0.514 0.919 0.164
M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.496 0.997 0.248 0.412 0.431 0.448 0.664 0.908 0.457
Observations 2,451 2,248 2,244 2,232 2,232 2,191 2,153 2,136 2,133
R-squared 0.158 0.363 0.418 0.291 0.076 0.074 0.052 0.157 0.127
Mean 2.162 2.082 0.872 0.644 0.401 0.178 0.707 0.566 0.428
Number of districts 320 320 320 320 320 320 315 320 320
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is total revenue, total or sectoral expenditure. All budget indicators are per capita and in real terms. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the
political mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1st year of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant
indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M−1edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a binary indicator taking
value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ)
and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years
before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
47
Table 12: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON BUREAUCRATS’ PROMOTIONS
AND DEMOTIONS
Dep. variable Demotions Promotions
Sub-Category Top Bureaucrats Administrative Front-line service providers
(1) (2) (3)
M+4edt × Id -0.269 -0.446 -0.031
(0.359) (0.784) (0.053)
M+3edt × Id 0.073 0.557 0.080*
(0.392) (0.698) (0.041)
M+2edt × Id 0.538 1.015* 0.097**
(0.359) (0.557) (0.043)
M+1edt × Id 0.963*** 1.335** 0.044
(0.362) (0.570) (0.032)
M0edt × Id 0.986** 0.926 0.068*
(0.390) (0.585) (0.041)
M−1edt × Id 0.102 0.071 0.038
(0.340) (0.382) (0.031)
M−2edt × Id -0.341 -0.338 -0.014
(0.363) (0.336) (0.018)
P-value: M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.309 0.542 0.195
P-value: M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.934 0.513 0.356
P-value: M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.225 0.141 0.075
P-value: M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.017 0.033 0.874
P-value: M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.032 0.245 0.485
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430
R-squared 0.276 0.443 0.197
Mean 3.075 5.746 0.217
Number of districts 320 320 320
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES
The dependent variable is promotion or demotions per capita. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political
mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1st year of the
mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M
−1
edt is a
binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M−2edt is a binary indicator taking value 1 two years
before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality
between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The
sample covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON THE NUMBER OF BUREAUCRATS
Dependent variable Number of bureaucrats who are
Seniority At least 5 years in office New Recruits
Officer Top Bureaucrat Administrative Front-line service providers Administrative Front-line service providers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
M+4edt × Id 10.124 -18.427 -44.996 -3.379 -7.286
(13.058) (27.532) (64.233) (13.322) (14.438)
M+3edt × Id 3.563 -27.235 -74.576 -10.741 -35.671
(10.765) (24.324) (56.427) (12.779) (27.760)
M+2edt × Id -5.443 -21.541 -96.643* -7.602 2.490
(9.078) (19.696) (49.793) (16.380) (23.113)
M+1edt × Id -4.272 -17.031 -61.958 -3.356 33.412*
(7.009) (17.331) (41.583) (10.574) (18.479)
M0edt × Id -8.478 3.068 -38.150 7.636 20.392
(5.253) (13.328) (34.197) (10.546) (22.528)
M−1edt × Id -4.534 11.793 -10.010 -4.090 -5.528
(3.305) (8.766) (26.701) (9.904) (15.684)
M−2edt × Id -1.237 1.502 -1.157 -1.797 -9.774
(2.182) (6.376) (19.973) (5.207) (7.087)
P-value: M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.237 0.252 0.571 0.960 0.916
P-value: M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.399 0.0874 0.210 0.680 0.335
P-value: M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.906 0.0654 0.0427 0.840 0.772
P-value: M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.964 0.0628 0.111 0.942 0.0811
P-value: M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.339 0.409 0.203 0.185 0.102
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430
R-squared 0.840 0.220 0.274 0.648 0.427
Mean 282.5 913.4 2744 109.6 143.4
Number of districts 320 320 320 320 320
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of bureaucrats with at least 5 years in office or the number of new recruits. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political
mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1st year of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator
for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M−1edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a binary indicator taking value 1
two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and
the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before
it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix
Additional tables
50
Table A1: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES CONTROLLING FOR EXPERIENCE AND ABILITY
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer Bureaucrat Top Bureaucrat Administrator Front-line service provider
Restriction All Future winners All Future winners All Future winners All Future winners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Medt × Id -0.256*** -0.213** -0.214* -0.079** -0.053 -0.052 -0.160*** -0.143** -0.152** -0.018 -0.017 -0.010
(0.086) (0.108) (0.109) (0.037) (0.043) (0.044) (0.056) (0.071) (0.072) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046)
M−1edt × Id 0.010 0.090 0.078 -0.023 0.035 0.036 0.005 0.025 0.019 0.028 0.030 0.023
(0.113) (0.158) (0.159) (0.056) (0.077) (0.078) (0.066) (0.094) (0.093) (0.037) (0.049) (0.049)
M−2edt × Id -0.060 -0.017 -0.023 -0.030 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 0.017 0.014 -0.018 -0.030 -0.033
(0.068) (0.087) (0.087) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.066) (0.066) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of years in office -0.100 -0.146 -0.007 0.017 -0.094 -0.134 0.000 -0.029
(0.153) (0.206) (0.063) (0.077) (0.108) (0.149) (0.065) (0.093)
Number of years in office2 0.014 0.020 0.001 -0.002 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.012
(0.016) (0.020) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
F-test: Medt × Id=M−1edt × Id 6.453 4.866 4.445 0.843 1.151 1.130 5.471 3.642 3.700 1.394 0.820 0.404
P-value 0.012 0.028 0.036 0.359 0.284 0.289 0.020 0.057 0.056 0.239 0.366 0.526
Observations 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966
R-squared 0.116 0.118 0.119 0.046 0.053 0.053 0.083 0.081 0.082 0.044 0.046 0.049
Mean 0.459 0.476 0.476 0.139 0.149 0.149 0.233 0.237 0.237 0.088 0.091 0.091
Number of districts 320 259 259 320 259 259 320 259 259 320 259 259
Control for Medt, M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed by a specific agent. The restriction “Future Winners” indicates that the group of first-term
politicians is restricted to those who will be reelected. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the
election year, “1” indicates the 1st year of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M
−1
edt is a binary indicator
for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M−2edt is a binary indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the
coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers
the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION CONTROLLING FOR PROSECUTORS’ ACTIVITY, EXPERIENCE AND ABILITY
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer Any bureaucrat Top Bureaucrat Administrative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Medt × Id -0.036* -0.089* -0.036* -0.101** -0.007 -0.025 -0.007 -0.028 -0.025* -0.060* -0.026** -0.068*
(0.021) (0.049) (0.021) (0.049) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022) (0.013) (0.035) (0.013) (0.035)
M−1edt × Id 0.021 0.036 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.005
(0.029) (0.069) (0.029) (0.069) (0.018) (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.015) (0.044) (0.015) (0.043)
M−2edt × Id 0.003 -0.012 0.002 -0.019 0.005 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.019) (0.040) (0.020) (0.041) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023) (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.030)
Number of years in office -0.025 -0.274** 0.002 -0.044 -0.022 -0.117
(0.038) (0.127) (0.015) (0.041) (0.026) (0.087)
Number of years in office2 0.004 0.031* -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.008
(0.004) (0.016) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009)
F-test: Medt × Id=M−1edt × Id 4.863 4.241 4.368 4.053 1.081 0.979 1.055 1.085 3.757 2.877 3.717 3.175
P-value 0.028 0.041 0.038 0.045 0.300 0.324 0.305 0.299 0.054 0.091 0.055 0.076
Observations 10,886 4,135 10,886 4,135 10,886 4,135 10,886 4,135 10,886 4,135 10,886 4,135
R-squared 0.026 0.234 0.026 0.235 0.011 0.187 0.011 0.187 0.018 0.245 0.018 0.246
Mean 0.089 0.229 0.089 0.229 0.030 0.074 0.030 0.074 0.043 0.112 0.043 0.112
Number of districts 259 199 259 199 259 199 259 199 259 199 259 199
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
“Prosecution year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
“Prosecution year”-district FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Drop “Prosecution year”-district with no offence YES YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed by a specific agent in district d at time t and prosecuted at time p. All specifications are estimated only on
the sample of “Future Winners,” i.e., either second-term politicians either first-term politicians who will be reelected. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started
with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1st year of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in
2005-2009. M−1edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a binary indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and
P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample
covers the political mandate starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES OVER THE ELECTORAL CYCLE CONTROLLING FOR EXPERIENCE AND ABILITY
Dependent variable number of corruption offences committed by
Officer Any Bureaucrat Top bureaucrats Administrative Front-line service providers
Mayor in first term All Future winners All Future winners All Future winners All Future winners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
M+4edt × Id -0.068 -0.062 -0.062 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 -0.052 -0.032 -0.040 -0.004 -0.026 -0.018
(0.128) (0.151) (0.153) (0.061) (0.069) (0.069) (0.101) (0.121) (0.122) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
M+3edt × Id -0.332** -0.343* -0.344* -0.053 -0.023 -0.023 -0.224** -0.252** -0.261** -0.055 -0.067 -0.060
(0.144) (0.177) (0.178) (0.067) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089) (0.107) (0.107) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
M+2edt × Id -0.311** -0.204 -0.205 -0.141*** -0.117** -0.117** -0.207*** -0.152 -0.161* 0.036 0.065 0.073
(0.133) (0.169) (0.170) (0.053) (0.057) (0.058) (0.077) (0.092) (0.093) (0.077) (0.118) (0.118)
M+1edt × Id -0.283*** -0.227* -0.228* -0.117** -0.084 -0.083 -0.104 -0.069 -0.079 -0.063* -0.074* -0.066*
(0.101) (0.121) (0.123) (0.049) (0.054) (0.056) (0.064) (0.086) (0.087) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
M0edt × Id -0.233** -0.195 -0.196 -0.049 -0.018 -0.017 -0.183** -0.185** -0.195** -0.001 0.008 0.016
(0.103) (0.129) (0.130) (0.050) (0.059) (0.060) (0.072) (0.093) (0.093) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043)
M−1edt × Id 0.010 0.090 0.078 -0.023 0.035 0.036 0.005 0.025 0.019 0.028 0.030 0.023
(0.113) (0.158) (0.159) (0.056) (0.077) (0.078) (0.066) (0.094) (0.094) (0.037) (0.049) (0.049)
M−2edt × Id -0.060 -0.017 -0.023 -0.030 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 0.017 0.014 -0.018 -0.030 -0.033
(0.068) (0.087) (0.087) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.066) (0.066) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of years in office -0.102 -0.148 -0.008 0.015 -0.095 -0.135 0.001 -0.028
(0.154) (0.206) (0.063) (0.077) (0.108) (0.149) (0.066) (0.093)
Number of years in officer2 0.015 0.021 0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.012
(0.016) (0.020) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012)
P-value: M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.583 0.369 0.413 0.885 0.679 0.681 0.603 0.656 0.643 0.572 0.379 0.518
P-value: M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.036 0.037 0.043 0.722 0.592 0.594 0.026 0.022 0.022 0.158 0.123 0.184
P-value: M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.014 0.060 0.071 0.111 0.097 0.100 0.023 0.123 0.118 0.912 0.754 0.661
P-value: M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.018 0.055 0.066 0.177 0.186 0.191 0.148 0.350 0.336 0.037 0.077 0.122
P-value: M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.049 0.089 0.102 0.702 0.563 0.565 0.017 0.034 0.032 0.443 0.663 0.882
Observations 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966
R-squared 0.118 0.120 0.120 0.048 0.055 0.055 0.085 0.084 0.085 0.047 0.050 0.053
Mean 0.459 0.476 0.476 0.139 0.149 0.149 0.233 0.237 0.237 0.088 0.091 0.091
Number of districts 320 259 259 320 259 259 320 259 259 320 259 259
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is the number of corruption offences committed by a specific agent. The restriction “Future Winners” indicates that the group of first-term politicians
is restricted to those who will be reelected. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1”
indicates the 1st year of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M
−1
edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the
2005-2009 elections. M−2edt is a binary indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for
equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate starting between 2005
and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON REVENUE, TOTAL AND SECTORAL EXPENDITURE CONTROLLING FOR EXPERIENCE AND ABILITY
Dep. variable Revenue Expenditure
Category Economic Functional
Sub-category Total Total Personnel Capital Goods and Services Other Admin Education Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
M+4edt × Id 0.126 0.284 0.252* 0.638** 0.106 0.269** 0.093 0.303 0.035 0.085 -0.003 -0.013 0.139* 0.189 0.013 0.263*** 0.098 0.329**
(0.097) (0.238) (0.140) (0.316) (0.074) (0.134) (0.087) (0.199) (0.039) (0.064) (0.026) (0.052) (0.077) (0.129) (0.040) (0.094) (0.083) (0.138)
M+3edt × Id 0.157 0.310 0.159 0.447 0.021 0.116 0.141 0.335* -0.002 0.027 -0.007 -0.008 -0.033 -0.001 -0.074 0.098 0.090 0.275*
(0.113) (0.214) (0.167) (0.281) (0.066) (0.101) (0.128) (0.195) (0.037) (0.055) (0.029) (0.042) (0.098) (0.127) (0.092) (0.092) (0.143) (0.166)
M+2edt × Id 0.123 0.272 0.180 0.360 0.061 0.086 0.066 0.237 0.053 0.060 -0.021 -0.013 0.116* 0.128 0.008 0.098* 0.095 0.235
(0.117) (0.212) (0.172) (0.257) (0.060) (0.094) (0.133) (0.168) (0.038) (0.051) (0.027) (0.040) (0.063) (0.114) (0.040) (0.059) (0.128) (0.150)
M+1edt × Id 0.204* 0.347 0.321* 0.402 0.079 0.036 0.176 0.329** 0.066* 0.051 -0.021 -0.006 0.103 0.095 0.052 0.065 0.145 0.239*
(0.118) (0.221) (0.163) (0.261) (0.061) (0.107) (0.108) (0.155) (0.040) (0.055) (0.027) (0.044) (0.092) (0.142) (0.043) (0.070) (0.091) (0.130)
M0edt × Id 0.138 0.276 0.187 0.162 0.017 -0.096 0.090 0.221 0.073 0.037 -0.017 0.006 0.036 0.007 0.065* -0.003 0.042 0.089
(0.125) (0.255) (0.149) (0.300) (0.037) (0.117) (0.114) (0.201) (0.047) (0.066) (0.027) (0.054) (0.087) (0.134) (0.039) (0.096) (0.083) (0.147)
M−1edt × Id 0.176* 0.174* 0.157 0.141 -0.005 -0.005 0.111* 0.104 0.042 0.038 -0.008 -0.014 0.018 0.022 0.054** 0.052* 0.068 0.073
(0.094) (0.099) (0.107) (0.111) (0.029) (0.030) (0.066) (0.069) (0.043) (0.044) (0.026) (0.027) (0.064) (0.066) (0.027) (0.027) (0.055) (0.055)
M−2edt × Id 0.034 0.034 -0.034 -0.038 -0.025 -0.024 -0.010 -0.011 0.018 0.015 -0.026 -0.029 -0.025 -0.027 -0.007 -0.008 0.004 0.003
(0.061) (0.062) (0.070) (0.071) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.042) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.051) (0.051) (0.020) (0.020) (0.046) (0.047)
Number of years in office 0.022 -0.079 -0.072 0.011 -0.023 0.011 -0.019 -0.071* -0.024
(0.078) (0.091) (0.044) (0.062) (0.022) (0.020) (0.050) (0.040) (0.047)
Number of years in office2 0.001 0.010 0.007* 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.008** 0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
P-value: M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.649 0.647 0.511 0.116 0.114 0.036 0.826 0.310 0.815 0.449 0.783 0.978 0.078 0.163 0.284 0.025 0.683 0.044
P-value: M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.877 0.527 0.990 0.278 0.680 0.215 0.785 0.204 0.197 0.843 0.952 0.865 0.617 0.858 0.159 0.615 0.862 0.170
P-value: M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.635 0.629 0.905 0.409 0.206 0.298 0.730 0.402 0.742 0.699 0.527 0.967 0.120 0.376 0.204 0.418 0.807 0.200
P-value: M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.770 0.395 0.295 0.308 0.129 0.692 0.523 0.112 0.502 0.831 0.591 0.822 0.359 0.630 0.968 0.840 0.335 0.151
P-value: M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id 0.660 0.656 0.794 0.943 0.371 0.424 0.820 0.522 0.221 0.981 0.560 0.663 0.789 0.912 0.617 0.543 0.687 0.903
Observations 1,991 1,974 1,837 1,820 1,834 1,817 1,824 1,807 1,823 1,806 1,791 1,774 1,775 1,760 1,750 1,734 1,748 1,732
R-squared 0.333 0.332 0.374 0.374 0.436 0.432 0.290 0.291 0.089 0.090 0.084 0.086 0.046 0.046 0.141 0.140 0.116 0.116
Mean 2.126 2.124 2.068 2.067 0.862 0.861 0.653 0.653 0.399 0.398 0.168 0.168 0.695 0.692 0.560 0.560 0.441 0.442
Number of districts 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 257 257 259 259 259 259
Control for M0,1,2,3,4edt , M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is total revenue, total or sectoral expenditure. All budget indicators are per capita and in real terms. All specifications are estimated only on the sample of “Future Winners,” i.e., either second-term politicians
either first-term politicians who will be reelected. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009 elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1
st year of the mandate and so on). Id is
a time-invariant indicator for first-term politicians elected in 2005-2009. M−1edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a binary indicator taking value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The
F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate starting
between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON BUREAUCRATS’ PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS
CONTROLLING FOR ABILITY AND EXPERIENCE
Dep. variable Demotions Promotions
Sub-Category Top Bureaucrats Administrative Front-line service providers
Sample All Future winners All Future winners All Future winners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
M+4edt × Id -0.358 -0.688* -0.807** -0.448 -1.177 -1.178 -0.032 -0.052 -0.052
(0.356) (0.402) (0.400) (0.782) (0.809) (0.807) (0.053) (0.064) (0.064)
M+3edt × Id -0.011 -0.151 -0.273 0.552 0.461 0.457 0.079* 0.069 0.068
(0.384) (0.511) (0.496) (0.694) (0.843) (0.837) (0.041) (0.048) (0.049)
M+2edt × Id 0.449 0.231 0.103 1.009* 1.186* 1.180* 0.097** 0.077 0.076
(0.357) (0.411) (0.409) (0.555) (0.677) (0.678) (0.043) (0.054) (0.054)
M+1edt × Id 0.874** 0.778* 0.651 1.328** 1.322** 1.316** 0.043 0.021 0.020
(0.362) (0.468) (0.465) (0.572) (0.665) (0.663) (0.032) (0.038) (0.039)
M0edt × Id 0.897** 0.746 0.618 0.920 1.342* 1.336* 0.068* 0.083 0.082
(0.383) (0.502) (0.493) (0.577) (0.784) (0.774) (0.041) (0.053) (0.052)
M−1edt × Id 0.052 -0.254 -0.330 0.031 -0.116 -0.156 0.036 0.047 0.047
(0.341) (0.413) (0.419) (0.387) (0.467) (0.476) (0.031) (0.047) (0.048)
M−2edt × Id -0.368 -0.496 -0.534 -0.358 -0.512 -0.532 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011
(0.363) (0.458) (0.458) (0.334) (0.400) (0.395) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Number of years in office -1.424*** -1.821*** -0.636 -0.520 -0.037 -0.000
(0.403) (0.527) (0.729) (0.937) (0.040) (0.052)
Number of years in office2 0.100*** 0.135*** 0.084 0.071 0.005 -0.001
(0.037) (0.048) (0.072) (0.091) (0.004) (0.005)
P-value: M+4edt × Id=M−1edt × Id7 0.264 0.269 0.226 0.574 0.233 0.251 0.208 0.125 0.124
P-value: M+3edt × Id=M−1edt × Id6 0.861 0.824 0.900 0.483 0.522 0.498 0.342 0.712 0.724
P-value: M+2edt × Id=M−1edt × Id5 0.270 0.253 0.307 0.130 0.109 0.103 0.070 0.417 0.431
P-value: M+1edt × Id=M−1edt × Id4 0.024 0.020 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.027 0.843 0.597 0.589
P-value: M0edt × Id=M−1edt × Id3 0.039 0.056 0.068 0.228 0.142 0.134 0.463 0.497 0.504
Observations 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966 2,430 1,966 1,966
R-squared 0.280 0.268 0.273 0.443 0.449 0.449 0.197 0.184 0.184
Mean 3.075 3.040 3.040 5.746 5.746 5.746 0.217 0.212 0.212
Number of districts 320 259 259 320 259 259 320 259 259
Control for Medt, M
−1
edt , M
−2
edt , YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-“election year” FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable is promotion or demotions per capita. The restriction “Future Winners” indicates that the group of first-term
politicians is restricted to those who will be reelected. Medt is a time-varying indicator for the political mandate started with the 2005-2009
elections (“0” indicates the election year, “1” indicates the 1st year of the mandate and so on). Id is a time-invariant indicator for first-term
politicians elected in 2005-2009. M−1edt is a binary indicator for the year preceding the 2005-2009 elections. M
−2
edt is a binary indicator taking
value 1 two years before the 2005-2009 elections. The F-test (and P-value) below the coefficient estimates show the test for equality between
the main coefficient (γ) and the effect of reelection incentives the year before the elections (γ−1). The sample covers the political mandate
starting between 2005 and 2008 and three years before it. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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